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PRELIMINARY HEARING AND THE RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION: DISHEROON v. STATE
Robert G. Sachse
In all criminal cases the defendant has the right to be confronted
by the prosecution's witnesses.' This right to confrontation has ancient
roots2 and has long been held to be "one of the fundamental guarantees
of life and liberty."3  The Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas,4 held
that a defendant's right to confrontation was made obligatory on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The Court declared that the sixth
amendment right of an accused to confront the witness against him is
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and to deprive an accused
of this right is a denial of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due
process of law.5
The requirement of confrontation is said to have two main pur-
poses which are (1) to secure to the defendant an opportunity for
cross-examination, and (2) to allow the trier of fact to observe the
demeanor of the witness while testifying. Of the two, the opportunity
for cross-examination is more important. While courts are cognizant
of the import of this right of confrontation they have also held that
neither the presence of the witness nor the ability to cross-examine at
trial is constitutionally required in every case. 6 The courts have long
held that the sixth. amendment cannot be literally construed.' The
primary reason given for holding that the right of confrontation is not
1. U.S. CONST., amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. .. ."
2. F. HELLER, Tim Six A m imEr 104 (1951).
3. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1898).
4. 380 U.S. 400 (1968).
5. Id. at 403; See, e.g., Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation,
119 U. PA. L. Rav. 711 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Griswold].
6. C. MCCORMiCK, EVIDENCE 484 (1954).
7. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Gov't of Virgin Islands v.
Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1967).
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absolute is that a literal interpretation would exclude all hearsay evi-
dence, allowing only evidence presented by witnesses present in open
court.8  A defendant's right of confrontation is subject to certain
exceptions. Most, if not all, of these exceptions are based on the idea
of protecting the public interest and preventing a "manifest failure of
justice ' 9 where evidence offered is subjected to and meets certain tests
of reliability. The recognized exceptions to a defendant's right of
confrontation are aligned closely with the exceptions to the rule against
admission of hearsay evidence.'0 Recognized exceptions to a defend-
ant's right of confrontation include the admissibility against an accused
of dying declarations," admissions of co-conspirators,' 2 and former
testimony of a now unavailable witness when an opportunity for cross-
examination has been afforded.'"
The nature of the criminal system in our courts is to favor the ac-
cused yet some courts in dealing with the accused's right of confronta-
tion have denied him this right on the same basis that they would allow
evidence to be introduced in a civil case as an exception to the hear-
say rule.'4 Although both such exceptions exist because of the inher-
ent reliability of the evidence offered, confrontation, unlike the num-
erous exceptions to the hearsay rule, is more than a direct guarantee
of reliability; it incorporates an element of fairness, of affording the de-
fendant an opportunity to test the evidence against him, no matter how
reliable that evidence may seem.' 5 "The orthodox principles supporting
the admission of certain types of hearsay evidence do not satisfy the
policies underlying the right of confrontation."' 6
Extensive litigation has arisen over the admission of testimony
taken at a former judicial proceeding. The requirements for its ad-
missibility are that the testimony must have been given under circum-
stances affording the defendant a "complete and adequate opportunity"
to cross-examine the witness against him,' 7 that the witness whose testi-
mony is offered in evidence must be shown to be actually unavailable
8. 378 F.2d at 547; Griswold, supra note 5.
9. 156 U.S. at 244.
10. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAav. L. REV. 63, 236 (1968);
Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YAML.J. 1434, 1436 (1966).
11. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
12. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
13. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
14. Id. at 240.
15. Note, 56 GEo. LU. 939 (1968).
16. Id. at 941.
17. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1968).
[Vol. 10:663
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RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
to give testimony at the present trial, and that the prosecution has made
a diligent effort to locate such witness. 8 This criteria has been applied
to testimony elicited at varying stages of the judicial process, including
a former trial'9 and a preliminary hearing.2" There is a sharp distinc-
tion between the nature and functions of these two steps in the legal
process and courts should not be too quick to view the reported testi-
mony from each as equally satisfying a defendant's right of confronta-
tion. In Barber v. Page, the Court stated:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for
the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A prelimi-
nary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration
into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its func-
tion is the more limited one of determining whether probable
cause exists to hold the accused for trial.21
Witnesses who have testified against the defendant in a former trial of
the same case have been subjected to cross-examination by the same
party, with the same motive, and in the same forum. Aside from the
absence of demeanor evidence, these similarities make the prior testi-
mony virtually identical to present live testimony.2 2  To exclude the
reported testimony from a former trial of the same case "would be car-
rying . . . constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. 23
However, is the preliminary hearing a sufficient forum for confrontation
such that testimony taken and recorded therein may be used at the de-
fendant's trial and not be violative of his constitutional right of confron-
tation?
In Disheroon v. State,24 the defendant was convicted for 'the of-
fense of unlawful delivery of marijuana and was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment. The state's case against the defendant rested primarily
on the testimony of one witness, an undercover police officer, who al-
legedly had purchased marijuana from the defendant. After the de-
fendant's arrest, a preliminary hearing was held at which the under-
cover police officer testified; the defendant's attorney waived cross-ex-
amination. At trial, this witness had disappeared and the state was un-
able to produce him to testify. The trial court, over defendant's ob-
18. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968).
19. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
20. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
21. Id. at 725.
22. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1995).
23. Id. at 243.
24. 518 P.2d 892 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
1975]
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jection, permitted the state to introduce into evidence the testimony of
the witness which was given at the preliminary hearing, holding that
the defendant had been afforded an "opportunity" to cross-examine the
witness at the earlier hearing and that the state had used "due dili-
gence" in an effort to produce the witness. Since the defendant had
waived cross-examination at the hearing, no cross-examination went be-
fore the jury.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower
court decision, relying heavily on the language of an earlier Oklahoma
decision, In re Bishop.2  There, the court held that the de-
fendant's failure to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hear-
ing may have constituted a waiver of the right of confrontation at trial
because the court found that the prosecution had made a diligent effort
to locate the witness and such witness was actually unavailable.2 The
court further reasoned that since the witness was unavailable the
"proper circumstances" existed and there was "justification" for holding
that defendant's opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hear-
ing sufficiently satisfied his constitutional right of confrontation; 7 but
in so holding it did not clearly define what those "circumstances"2 8 were
which justified allowing such testimony other than that the state had
made a "diligent effort" to locate the now missing witness.
In Oklahoma it has long been held that testimony of a witness taken
at a preliminary hearing, where opportunity for cross-examination
was afforded (whether or not exercised), can be used against the de-
fendant at a subsequent trial without violating the accused's constitu-
tional right to confrontation. 29 Such evidence has been treated much
the same as the "reported testimony" exception to the hearsay rule.
The requirements for admissibility are very similar, with one exception:
in the criminal case there must be a showing by the state of "due dili-
gence" in trying to locate the witness.30
25. 443 P.2d 768 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
26. Id. at 769.
27. Id. at 772.
28. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
29. Newton v. State, 403 P.2d 913 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Rath v. State, 56 Okla.
Crim. 179, 38 P.2d 963 (1935); Bailey v. State, 55 Okla. Crim. 349, 30 P.2d 714(1934); Rich v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 418, 1 P.2d 805 (1931); Tobin v. State, 49 Okla.
Crim. 412, 293 P. 575 (1931); Valentine v. State, 16 Okla. Crim. 76, 194 P. 254 (1921).
30. The right of confrontation, guaranteed by the sixth amendment, was obviously
thought of by the framers of the Constitution as an essential right of every individual
so as to insure him a fair trial. By including it in the Bill of Rights, the framers surely
did not intend such a right could be overcome without just cause and overwhelming ne-
cessity. Griswold, supra note 5.
[Vol. 10: 663
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RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
By allowing the introduction at trial of testimony taken at a pre-
liminary hearing upon the state's proof of compliance with those re-
quirements set out in Disheroon,31 confrontation becomes more nearly
a rule of evidence rather than a constitutionally guaranteed right. The
court's decision, equating a face-to-face encounter at the preliminary
hearing with confrontation at trial, apparently rests on the fact that the
witness' testimony was elicited in a courtroom atmosphere at the hear-
ing, under oath, subject to the penalty for perjury, and available to be
cross-examined by the accused. These factors are presumed to estab-
lish its reliability. "These factors are not insignificant but by them-
selves they fall far short of satisfying the demands of constitutional con-
frontation." 2  To satisfy the requirements of confrontation, the ac-
cused must be afforded a "complete and adequate opportunity" to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. 3  The bare existence of an
opportunity for cross-examination supplies only a limited indicator of
the opportunity's adequacy, especially where the prior proceeding was
a preliminary hearing.
The character of the witness and his connection with the offense
with which the accused is charged are vital qualitative factors in deter-
mining the adequacy of the opportunity to cross-examine. This is par-
ticularly so when the witness is a police informer or an undercover po-
lice officer; his cross-examination is vital to the defense, for he and the
accused may have been the only participants in the transaction consti-
tuting the alleged offense, the remainder of the prosecution's evidence
consisting only of circumstantial support for the witness' testimony.34
In such a situation, it is of prime importance to the defense that the
ultimate trier of fact be able to view the witness' demeanor upon cross-
examination in order that proper weight may be given to his testimony.
"The informer's veracity may be the only chink in the prosecution ar-
mor, attack on his credibility the only method of piercing it.' ' 31
The court in Disheroon implied that the defendant's failure to
cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing may have consti-
tuted a waiver of his right of confrontation at a subsequent trial; such
waiver was deemed to be "an intentional relinquishment of a known
31. 518 P.2d at 894.
32. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 199 (1970) (dissenting opinion); People v.
Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (Cir. Ct. App. 1967).
33. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1968).
34. People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (Cir. CL App.
1967).
35. Id. at 476.
19751
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right."' 6  However, the court apparently overlooked the language of
the Supreme Court in Barber:
The State argues that petitioner waived his right to con-
front Woods at trial by not cross-examining him at the pre-
liminary hearing. That contention is untenable. . . . To
suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances
constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subse-
quent trial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a
waiver as an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege."37
Further, in Motes v. United States,38 the Court held that the mere
unavailability of a witness who had testified at the preliminary hearing
was insufficient to overcome the accused's right of confrontation unless
such unavailability was procured or fostered by or on the behalf of the
defendant. 9 In that case, the witness' unavailability was due to the
negligence of the prosecution. It would seem appropriate for the state
to use recognizance or surety as a means of assuring a witness' appear-
ance at trial in order that the rights of a defendant be more adequately
protected, especially if the courts are inclined to admit into evidence
the transcript of a witness' testimony taken at a preliminary hearing.40
It is conceded that in situations of necessity the importance of the
public interest may qualify the right of a defendant to be condemned
only by witnesses the jury can see and appraise;4' however, the
accused's right to confrontation cannot be justly qualified or denied
simply on the basis that the state has shown a diligent effort to locate
the witness and that such witness is actually unavailable. This is es-
pecially so where the testimony was taken at a preliminary hearing, the
nature of cross-examination at which has been recognized as being less
searching than that engaged in at trial. The court must go beyond the
unavailability and due diligence tests in allowing prior testimony into
evidence. It must consider a number of important factors, which in-
elude the intended purpose of the confrontation clause, the nature of
36. 518 P.2d at 894; cf. Commonwealth v. Mustone, 233 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1968).
The court held that by failing to cross-examine a witness at preliminary hearing, the
defendant was deemed to have "assumed the risk" that the witness would die or become
otherwise unavailable before trial.
37. 390 U.S. at 725 (citations omitted). Waiver of a federally guaranteed right is
a federal question controlled by federal law. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
38. 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
39. Id. at 471.
40. Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. REv. 164
(1965).
41. Case cited note 9 supra.
[Vol. 10:663
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RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
the former proceeding, the manner in which that proceeding was actu-
ally conducted, the character of background of the unavailable witness,
and the circumstances or the efficient cause of his unavailability.
The general purpose and the extent of the confrontation clause
have been interpreted in differing language by the courts. The most
widely accepted statement of the purpose of the confrontation clause
is found in Mattox v. United States:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in
question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits,
such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of be-
lief.42
It is recognized that the above cited right of confrontation is not abso-
lute, 43 and that the constitutional guarantee has, in cases permitting re-
ported testimony to be introduced into evidence against the accused,
been limited to the assurance of the right to cross-examine the witness
before his testimony may be used at a later trial.44 However, is merely
a "complete and adequate" opportunity for cross-examination at the
prior proceeding sufficient to overcome a defendant's constitutional
right to confrontation where such prior proceeding was a preliminary
hearing?45
The right to confrontation is a trial right.4 6 This principle was set
forth by the Court in Turner v. Louisiana in which it was held:
In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal
case necessarily implies at the very least that the "evidence
developed" against a defendant shall come from the witness
stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial pro-
42. 156 U.S. 237, 24243 (1895).
43. Cases cited note 7 supra.
44. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1968).
45. See, e.g., 5 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE §§ 1396, 1397 (3d ed. 1940). Professor
McCormick noted that the constitutional guarantees of confrontation only state that the
accused must be confronted with witnesses against him, not that the accused must be
confronted with the witnesses against him at final trial. C. MCCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 484
(1954).




Sachse: Preliminary Hearing and the Right to Confrontation: Disheroon v.
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
tection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-ex-
amination, and of counsel.47
A preliminary hearing is not a trial; 48 it is merely a step toward other
proceedings49 and whether it can ever provide "full judicial protection"
to the accused is subject to dispute. The purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.50
If the reviewing magistrate finds that the prosecution has shown "prob-
able cause," the accused is bound over for trial. It often appears that
the magistrates allow effectuation of the binding over function of a pre-
liminary hearing to override all other considerations, apparently reason-
ing that the hearing is only preliminary to trial and not of crucial im-
portance to the accused since he will be given an opportunity to estab-
lish his innocence at trial.51 "Consequently, magistrates and reviewing
courts tend to deal with matters at the preliminary hearing mechani-
cally without considering the interests or functions involved. ' 2  By
making "binding over" (upon a showing of probable cause) the main
purpose of the preliminary hearing, the courts tend to limit their scope
of analysis to the interest of the prosecution while giving only lip serv-
ice to the phrase that the hearing is held "primarily for the benefit
of the accused."53 In People v. Gibbs it was stated:
[In preliminary examination,] the prosecution need only
show "probable cause," a burden vastly lighter than proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Committing magistrates usually
accept the prosecution evidence at face value, leaving credi-
bility judgments for the trial of guilt.54
The use of reported testimony from a former trial has long been
recognized as an exception to the right of the accused to confront a
47. 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1968).
48. Application of Melton, 342 P.2d 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (dictum); In-
verarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okla. Crim. 294, 262 P.2d 725 (1953); State v. Harris, 44 Okla.
Crim. 116, 279 P. 925 (1929); MeCurdy v. State, 39 Okla Crim. 310, 264 P. 925
(1928); Ex parte Beville, 6 Okla. Crim. 145, 117 P. 725 (1911).
49. A preliminary hearing is not a trial since it does not result in a final disposition
of guilt or innocence; it merely determines whether a trial is necessary.
50. McAllister v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 167, 260 P.2d 454 (1953); Lyon v. State,
55 Okla. Crim. 286, 28 P.2d 598 (1934); Neff v. State, 39 Okla. Crim. 133, 264 P.
649 (1928).
51. Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. REv. 164
(1965).
52. Id. at 164.
53. Id. at 177; Ex parte Miller, 82 Okla. Crim. 315, 169 P.2d 574 (1946) (dic-
tum).
54. 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (1967).
[Vol. 10:665
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witness when testifying. 5  A former trial generally provides the "full
judicial protection" guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment,
with the possible exception of the ability of the trier of fact to judge
the demeanor of the witness. 6 There are inherent differences be-
tween a full-fledged trial and a preliminary hearing which should be
considered before courts equate the two in allowing reported testimony
from such prior proceeding into evidence.57 It would be the rare case
where confrontation at a preliminary hearing could compensate for the
absence of confrontation at trial."' In Barber the Court recognized the
differences between the nature of the two proceedings stating that a
preliminary hearing was a much less searching exploration of a case
due to its limited function of determining probable cause. 9 The court
in Gibbs0 aptly described a preliminary hearing and its limitations:
In most California criminal prosecutions the preliminary
examination is conducted as a rather perfunctory uncontested
proceeding with only one likely denouement-an order hold-
ing the defendant for trial. Only television lawyers custom-
arily demolish the prosecution in the magistsrates court.61
The primary confrontation right of an accused is the right to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In Mattox and cases following it
the courts have assumed that the confrontation requirement is satisfied
even though there was no cross-examination during the trial as long as
the critical right to cross-examination has been exercised at some other
stage of the criminal process. Various tests have been stated by the
Court which must be met before the prior testimony may be admitted
at trial; prior testimony has been held to be allowable as long as the
defendant had "a complete and adequate opportunity"62 to cross-exam-
ine or as long as the defendant's right to cross-examination was not "sig-
nificantly limited '6 3 at the prior proceeding. Given the nature and pur-
pose of a preliminary hearing, as opposed to a trial, is the cross-exam-
ination at that stage of the judicial process constitutionally adequate?
55. Supra note 20.
56. Supra notes 21, 22.
57. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the court found there was no sig-
nificant difference in a trial and a preliminary hearing for purposes of confrontation as
long as a defendant's right of cross-examination was not significantly limited and that
the right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance as long as
the declarant's inability to give live testimony is in no way the fault of the state.
58. Id. at 190 (dissenting opinion).
59. 390 U.S. at 725.
60. 255 Cal. App. 2d at -, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
61. Id. at 475 n.2.
62. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1968).
63. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
1975]
9
Sachse: Preliminary Hearing and the Right to Confrontation: Disheroon v.
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Justice Brennan, dissenting in California v. Green, 4 stated: "Cross-
examination at the [preliminary] hearing pales beside that which takes
place at trial." The rationale behind his statement is that (1) as noted
supra, the objective of a preliminary hearing is merely to establish prob-
able cause, not guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, and
therefore the defense has little reason to show that the evidence offered
does not conclusively establish guilt; (2) neither the defense nor the
prosecution is eager before trial to disclose its case by extensive exami-
nation at this stage; (3) lengthy preliminary hearings cannot easily be
accommodated either by the court or counsel and such would be re-
quired if extensive cross-examination were to be had; and (4) both
the defense and prosecution have generally had inadequate time before
hearing to prepare for extensive examination.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino the distinction be-
tween cross-examination at preliminary hearing and at trial was ex-
plored by the court; it stated:
Were the question one of first impression it would seem that
a clear distinction should be recognized between testimony
given at a prior trial and testimony given at a preliminary
hearing. In the case of a prior trial the goal of the cross-
examiner is precisely the same as that which he would have
followed at the second trial-acquittal of the defendant.
At the preliminary hearing, however, the cross-examiner is
much more narrowly confined by the nature of the proceed-
ing. The government's aim is merely to show a prima facie
case and its tactic is to withhold as much of its evidence as
it can once it has crossed that line. The fear of adding to
the government's case by extensive cross-examination weighs
heavily on a defendant's counsel at a preliminary hearing,
where much of the government's case remains still in doubt.
The cross-examiner therefore is in a far different position
than he would be at trial, where the government must go be-
yond its prima facie case to convince the jury of the defend-
ant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Everyday experience
confirms the difference, for it is rare indeed that on a pre-
liminary hearing there will be that full and detailed cross-ex-
amination which the witness would undergo at trial. Credi-
bility is not the issue at the preliminary hearing as it is in a
trial. All the arts of cross-examination which are exerted to
impair the credibility of a witness are useless in a preliminary
hearing. 65
64. Id. at 197 (dissenting opinion).
65. 378 F.2d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 10:663
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While recognizing these inherent differences and the limitations of pre-
liminary hearing cross-examination, the court allowed the transcript of
a witness' preliminary hearing testimony upon the following reasoning:
"Nevertheless, we must accept for present purposes the rule which
makes no distinction between testimony given at a prior trial and the
testimony given at a preliminary hearing."'6 6 Other courts have recog-
nized the deficiencies of preliminary hearing cross-examination and
held that such was lacking in constitutional validity. 7 Even where the
defendant has been afforded the right to cross-examination, the "great-
est legal engine ever invented for discovery of the truth,"6 8 the inability
of the defendant to cross-examine at trial because of the witness' una-
vailability may have a significant effect on the "integrity of the fact find-
ing process."6 9
In addition to the primary right to confrontation, i.e. cross-exam-
ination, authorities usually agree that confrontation includes the secon-
dary right of demeanor evidence; but most have been hesitant to hold
it a constitutionally mandatory right.70  Demeanor is of the utmost im-
portance in the determination of the credibility of the witness.
The innumerable telltale indications which fall from a witness
during the course of his examination are often much more
of an indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the re-
liability of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his
words. 1
If the court allows into evidence reported testimony from a preliminary
hearing, the defendant can in no way "test the recollection and sift the
conscience" of a witness regarding the facts of an alleged offense if that
witness is unavailable. The defense cannot probe the story of an una-
vailable witness and attempt to expose facts and discredit his testimony.
As noted above, much of the confusion in courts' discussion of the
right to confrontation is caused by the similarities between the confron-
66. Id. at 549.
67. 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (Cir. Ct. App. 1967). "That the
speaker of the words therein recorded had been cross-examined on another day, before
another trier of fact, and for another purpose-i.e., to establish probability, not guilt-
was without practical significance to the ultimate trier of fact and we find the process
lacking in constitutional validity." People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 427,
75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 786 (1969).
68. 5 J. WiGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
69. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969).
70. Professor Wigmore believed that the demeanor requirement should be met when-
ever possible, but found that, unlike the requirement of cross-examination it is merely
desirable but not necessary. 5 J. WIMoE, EvmENcE § 1395 (3d ed. 1940).
71. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967).
1975]
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tation clause and the hearsay rule and the unavailability exceptions un-
der each.71 Some authorities have concluded that any valid exception
to the hearsay rule is also a valid exception to the confrontation
clause.15 Such is clearly erroneous, for the purposes behind the two
rules are far from identical. While both are intended to exclude evi-
dence that has not been tested by cross-examination, the confrontation
clause has additional purposes including that of giving the accused the
opportunity to have the witness face the trier of fact when giving his
testimony and when it is being tested by cross-examination.
The courts' decisions as to the admissibility of testimony taken at
a preliminary hearing ultimately depend on whether the interest of the
prosecution in presenting relevant evidence, and therefore upholding
the public interest, outweighs the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation.
The State, obviously, does need to introduce relevant
evidence. But the "necessity" that justifies the admission of
pretrial statements is not the prosecution's need to convict,
but the factfinder's need to be presented with reliable evi-
dence to aid its determination of guilt or innocence. Whe-
ther a witness' assertions are reliable ordinarily has little or
no bearing on their admissibility for they are subject to the
corrective influences of his demeanor and cross-examination.
If, however, there is no possibility that his assertions can be
so tested at trial then their reliability becomes an important
factor in deciding whether to permit their presentation to the
factfinder. When a probability exists that incriminating pre-
trial testimony is unreliable, its admission, absent confronta-
tion, will prejudicially distort the factfinding process. 74
Courts should not be too quick to accept testimony from a preliminary
hearing. For, although the right to confrontation is not absolute, the
sixth amendment does at least require the courts to inquire into and
make a critical examination of the facts and circumstances of each case.
72. As a result of these similarities it has frequently been held that the right of con-
frontation may not be invoked to exclude evidence otherwise acceptable under the legit-
imate exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); Matthews v. United States,
217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1943).
73. Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evi-
dence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1965).
74. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 201 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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